Despite the many approaches of neoclassical and endogenous growth theory, economists still face problems explaining the reasons for income differences between countries. Institutional economics and the deep determinants of growth literature try to depart from pure economic facts to examine economic development. Therefore, this article analyses the impact of institutions, geography and integration on per capita income. Concerning theoretical reasoning, emphasis is on the emergence of institutions and their effect on economic growth.
Introduction
Despite the many approaches of neoclassical and endogenous growth theory, economists still face problems explaining the reasons for income differences between countries. Economic growth cannot be solely determined by the conventional factors of production like physical and human capital accumulation and technological progress. However, breaking down the unknown process of productivity, growth theory has no other choice than to open up to deeper determinants of growth that might originate in other disciplines. This is what institutional economics does. Although the starting point of all actions remains familiar since human interactions are driven by scarcities, incentives and the desire to decrease uncertainty and transaction costs, further explanations shift away from pure economics and open up an interdisciplinary approach. Political, legal and historical sciences, geography, trade and even culture and psychology are considered (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Porta and Scazzieri, 1997; Gallup et al., 1998; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik, 2003; Sachs, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 2004; Przeworski, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2005; Guiso et al., 2006; Knowles and Weatherston, 2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Fernández and Fogli, 2007; Tabellini, 2007; Fernández, 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2008; Tabellini, 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Williamson, 2009 ).
However, in this article, the emergence of institutions and their impact on economic outcome are emphasized. Most of the work on institutions deals with political, judicial and economic, and thus formal, institutions. Often the protection of property rights is assumed to be the basic institutional feature for economic success. Therefore, the analysis reverts to a property rights measure concerning formal institutions. Additionally, culture is emphasized as a crucial determinant of economic growth. Culture is defined as the values, norms, habits, conventions, codes of conduct, traditions, attitudes and beliefs of a society; and it is equated with the term 'informal institutions'. Since informal institutions incorporate beliefs as well as the behaviour that implements these beliefs, religion is closely related to them.
The theoretical argument demonstrates the transmission channels between institutions and per capita income and emphasizes the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. Moreover, a regression analysis incorporating informal and formal institutions, geography and trade is run.
The regression results affirm a crucial role of formal and informal institutions concerning economic development.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: in the second part, formal and informal institutions are determined and the interrelations between institutions and per capita income are depicted. The third section emphasizes the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality. The method of instrumental variable estimation is presented as a possible solution concerning the econometric analysis. The fourth part presents the data used in the empirical analysis, which incorporates geography and trade variables. Furthermore, the regression approach is depicted. Accordingly, the fifth section demonstrates the regression results. The conclusions are presented in the last part.
Formal and informal institutions
Institutions constitute the social, political, legal and economic systems of a state. According to North (1990) , 'Institutions are the rules of the game in a society ... (they) are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. … they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic' (p. 1). Hence, institutions are the framework within which social life takes place. Without institutions a human's reaction to a particular incentive is unpredictable. No patterns exist that could help to forecast human behaviour.
Furthermore, misconduct cannot be sanctioned since a difference between 'good' and 'bad' behaviour is not defined. Therefore, people strive for a situation in which others' reactions are predictable and hence uncertainty and transaction costs can be reduced. To achieve their target, humans are prepared to impose constraints on themselves whereby codes of conduct emerge that afford reliable expectations and therefore reduce uncertainty. These restrictions are called institutions. They are created by human beings to impose binding rules on social interactions. Institutions specify how to behave in certain situations and, hence, human actions become predictable. Violations are punished and offences against the constraints imply particular costs. Thus, uncertainty as well as information, monitoring and enforcement costs are reduced. Accordingly, we can think of institutions as a particular legal system, the constitution of a state or business regulations. In general, rules that constitute the political, legal, economic and social environment and are formally written down in a rule book, be it for example a legal text or a constitution, are called formal institutions. On the other hand, life is not constrained solely by formal institutions. Morals, norms, values, habits, conventions, traditions and codes of conduct also influence human behaviour. These cultural factors are called informal institutions. They are not officially written down and a violation must not lead to state-run but rather public or societal punishment. Usually informal institutions underlie formal institutions since they determine a society's basic attitudes and beliefs. Sometimes individuals might feel constrained by informal institutions that relate to their conviction rather than by formal institutions.
Much work has been carried out on the issue of formal institutions and their impact on economic growth. Clearly, a country's economic development is determined by its political, legal and economic systems. Less is known regarding informal institutions and their effect on economic outcome. If societies differ concerning their cultural characteristics, aggregated behaviour will vary and thus affect economic outcome differently. Therefore, the following section will examine the transmission channels between formal and informal institutions and economic growth.
Informal institutions are defined as values, morals, conventions, norms, habits, traditions, codes of conduct, attitudes and beliefs. The corresponding transmission channel is the individual her-or himself as informal institutions affect economic development on an aggregated level through their influence on people's behaviour. An early example regarding informal institutions and their influence on economic development is Max Weber's popular thesis concerning the Protestant work ethic (Weber, 2002 (Weber, , originally published in 1904 .
Weber argues that the emergence of capitalism was closely related to the belief, and hence the resulting behaviour, of the Protestant population. Following his argument, work was not just a means to an end but the purpose of life and God's will. People believed that God's chosen ones were pleased with a materially good and safe life. Hence, everybody tried to achieve a high living standard in order to believe that she or he was a chosen one. In other societies, where material standards play no role regarding God's goodwill, people lack the accordant incentives to work hard and to invest. Therefore, according to Weber, countries with a high proportion of Protestant citizens were economically more successful than others. 1 Consequently, beliefs, attitudes and codes of conduct resulting from religious affiliation affect the development of economies. Weber's thesis comes close to this work, as religious origins result in norms and values that people implement in everyday life. For now, the religious dimension will be skipped but we will refer to this point later. At any rate, the hypothesis states that particular informal institutions support factor accumulation and technological progress while others do not. The challenge is to measure informal institutions and to point out concrete features with which the impact on economic growth can be analysed.
Therefore, the emphasis is on three commonly used informal institutional factors, which will also play a role in the empirical analysis to describe the impact of culture on economic growth. These factors are trust, control over one's own life and the societal structure, hence limited vs. generalized morality (Platteau, 2000) .
The role of trust in an economy has been studied for some time, especially in game theoretical
approaches. An individual's level of trust depends on her or his cultural and societal background, as well as on experiences and upbringing. If children are taught to trust other people, they will apply what they have learned without critical request, eventually for all their life, and will pass their attitudes on to their own children.
2 Hence, individuals are taught to trust or not to trust affiliates of a certain group (Greif, 1994; Platteau, 2000) . Knack and Keefer (1997) , for example, find out that the level of trust is higher in countries with less ethnical and class discrepancy. Hence, in hierarchical societies, where familial or tribal affiliation is important, the level of trust within the respective group is high, whereas beyond the group individuals do not trust others. Since trust is an informal institution, it is slowmoving (Roland, 2005) . That is to say, the attitudes responsible for an individual's level of trust change slowly and an external alteration is difficult. At any rate, institutions are dynamic entities. That is to say, they are continually altered through historical accidents and endogenous processes. Logical reasoning, for example, in the course of time, can lead to a modification of attitudes, beliefs and world views.
Trust, however, has several impacts on economic performance. La Porta et al. (1997) find that trust increases judicial efficiency, bureaucratic quality and tax compliance, while high levels of trust decrease corruption. In high-trust societies, however, information is replaced by trust.
Hence, the corresponding monitoring expenses decrease. Furthermore, people in high-trust societies may not record every detail of an act of sale and spend less time and money on lawyers and on the monitoring process. The business environment and, in general, economic transactions may be less regulated than in low-trust societies. People in high-trust societies put more confidence in the government and other official agencies, which results in higher credibility. Therefore, incentives to innovate and to invest are higher. Since transaction costs are low, more capital and more time is available for innovation and investment. Additionally, investors in a high-trust society will realize the optimal investment strategy over the long run rather than the short run. Trust enhances anonymous market exchange and decreases the need for external enforcement. That is to say, trust also increases the gains from labour division and trade (Putnam, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997) .
However, these examples already indicate the ambiguous character of institutional relations since an adequate regulatory structure and legal system might also increase the level of trust.
Higher per capita incomes, however, lead to a general change in perspectives and priorities and, hence, modify a society's level of trust in the long term. Thus, a clear causality between trust and the respective formal institutions or rather per capita income does not exist. At any rate, it is obvious that a high level of trust decreases transaction costs while it leads to an increase in the quantity of transactions. Therefore, trust is associated with higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997) .
Another informal institutional feature is an individual's conviction concerning control over one's own life. If people are persuaded that they are able to influence destiny, they will try to improve their situation and be proactive. If, on the other hand, people believe in predestination, they are not in a position to better their situation through their own initiative.
Hence, investment in physical and human capital will in general be lower than in a society in which everybody works hard and invests to improve her or his life. The attitude concerning control over one's own life can originate from religious beliefs and cultural background but it can also be the result of the formal institutional environment. An authoritarian political system that domineers over its citizens combined with bad economic performance, and therefore low per capita income, probably does not entail self-confidence but resignation. A higher living standard, however, contributes to an attitude of self-determination and selfconfidence. People endued with property would rather maintain that their wealth can be traced back to their own decisions and activities. These individuals will also believe that they can shape their future according to their own wishes. Of course, wealth can also be traced back to destiny, as, for example, in Weber's thesis on the Protestant work ethic. At any rate, a high living standard will be preferred to be traced back to one's own efforts, and hence will encourage further endeavour. Hence, causality is again ambiguous. At any rate, believing in predestination rather inhibits growth on an aggregated level.
The last example for informal institutional influence on individual behaviour and thus economic development is the prevalent societal structure, hence generalized or limited morality (Platteau, 2000 (Greif, 1993; Greif, 1994; Platteau, 2000; Tabellini, 2005; Tabellini, 2007; Tabellini, 2008) . The impact of the societal structure on economic development is studied by Greif (1994) . The author explores the different development paths of Maghribis and Genoese traders in the late eleventh century.
According to him, wealth differences can be traced back to differing societal patterns. In particular, it is decisive whether the society exhibits a collectivist or an individualist structure.
Via a one-sided prisoner's dilemma, Greif demonstrates that the economic success of the Genoese, compared with the Maghribis, can be ascribed to their individualist societal order.
Thus, differences in societal organization can be traced back to distinct cultural affiliations.
The transition from limited to generalized morality, however, is fluent. Codes of conduct and trust decrease with distance. That is to say, even if generalized morality is prevalent within a society, limited morality might be practised if we extend the geographical scope (Tabellini, 2007) . Tabellini (2008) argues that limited and generalized morality not only shape economic development, but are a matter of the development progress itself. Accordingly, 'At early stages of development, transactions are mainly local, and both values and cooperation remain more limited in scope. As development progresses, and impersonal transactions gain relevance, this is accompanied by a generalization of the scope of values and cooperation' (p. 28). Hence, Tabellini hints at the issue of reverse causality, since societal organization influences economic development while economic development impacts on values and beliefs and, therefore, societal organization. This is also true for political institutions. Hence, generalized morality supports good governance and inter alia (Tabellini, 2007) . However, we
should not rely on the fact that economic development shapes values and beliefs in a way that supports generalized morality and, therefore, further progress. The interdependencies between economic development and generalized versus limited morality can also lead an economy to be stuck in a state of backwardness. Societies that practice limited morality may have less respect for the law and may be more tolerant of lax law enforcement, since informal institutions govern their interrelationships. On the other hand, the quality of law enforcement may strengthen sound values, beliefs and morals (Tabellini, 2008) .
Regarding formal institutions, the protection of property rights is usually described as the decisive institutional feature concerning growth (North, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Platteau, 2000; Rodrik, 2007; Kerekes and Williamson, 2008; Williamson and Kerekes, 2009 ). The exclusiveness and the irreproachable allocation of ownership offer the crucial incentive to invest that emanates from property rights. That is to say, property rights accord the owner of an asset the exclusive rights to decide on the utilization of her or his asset. Therefore, the owner will use her or his property in a way that maximizes her or his utility. According to De
Soto (2000), property rights highlight the economic potential of an asset and, even more importantly, assets can be used as collateral. Hence, property can generate new capital and receive credit. However, property rights, coupled with an appropriate law to protect them are, according to De Soto, the lifeline of economic success in Western economies.
Despite the direct channel on income, the dominance of secure property rights also makes a statement concerning the political and legal environment of a state. Property rights are usually not afforded in dictatorships, where expropriation by the political power or even by private interest groups is possible since no appropriate law and no independent judiciary exist. Hence, unsecure property rights are accompanied by less political and economic freedom, fewer civil rights and a manipulable judiciary. The allocation of secure property rights requires an independent judiciary that must be able to enforce property rights against governmental and private offences. Democracy ensures that formal institutions cannot be changed on behalf of a certain interest group that possesses the appropriate resources. Property rights in conjunction with civil liberties guarantee the efficient use of every asset in a state, and therefore maximal per capita income. Nevertheless, property rights can also exist and be protected in other political systems, but since their application will probably be constrained in a non-democratic state, total economic efficiency will be adversely affected (Rodrik, 2007; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008) . Furthermore, to develop their full potential, ownership rights must be accompanied by a free-market system that allows every person to use his or her assets in a way that maximizes their individual utility. Then, the economy can realize its maximal growth potential on an aggregated level.
Endogeneity and instrumental variable estimation
Empirical analysis of institutions is particularly hampered by the fact that '… institutional quality is as endogenous to income levels as anything can possibly be' (Rodrik, 2007, p. 185) .
Hence, we are talking about a complex institutional system, characterized by complementarities and feedback between informal and formal institutions; and between institutions and economic development (Williamson, 2000; Roland, 2005; Boettke et al., 2008; Dolfsma and Verburg, 2008 However, radical changes in political and economic institutions are difficult to explain without the introduction of informal institutions. 3 An increase in per capita income alters informal institutions, which in turn impact on formal institutions. The basic settings of a society can jointly be responsible for the general concept of the state, the political system and the structure of power. An autocratic government and a hierarchic social system, which repress parts of the population, may enhance explicit cultural features like disrespect, mistrust, resignation, a collective social structure and, hence, limited morality. In turn, these cultural characteristics again support the preservation of an authoritarian government and, in general, of the prevalent formal institutional structure. An increasing per capita income improves the level of informal institutions in the sense that people become more trustful and respectful, self-reliant and confident. Apart from that, higher income levels might be correlated with higher educational standards, and therefore with more open-minded and educated individuals.
Hence, due to their higher per capita incomes, the individuals are able to enforce institutions that fit their interests. Therefore, people might be rather able to question traditional belief and value systems. Consequently, the political system will be challenged. Hence, a democratic state supports growth-supporting informal institutions. Independent citizens who can freely participate in political, economic and social processes realize a higher level of trust, selfdetermination and self-confidence.
Figures 1 to 5 demonstrate the correlations between our informal institutional measures and per capita income. 4 However, seemingly growth-supportive attitudes are correlated with high income levels, while growth-inhibiting features come along with low income levels. Hence, the graphs demonstrate a clear relationship between informal institutions and per capita income. Still, no statement concerning causality can be made.
An increase in per capita income may alter not only informal, but also formal institutions. view, the instrumental variable must provide a convenient source of exogenous variation and must not be intuitively correlated with institutions (Rodrik, 2007, p. 185ff.) . However, an intuitive justification for the use of a certain instrumental variable is desirable, since it will help to understand institutional emergence better.
The following regression analysis uses data on different religious affiliations as instrumental variables for informal and formal institutions. Hence, it is assumed that the religious environment affects institutions, which then influence per capita income (Weber, 2002; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Guiso et al., 2003) . Religion cannot directly be correlated with income if we want to use it as an instrumental variable. However, just being religious does not affect economic outcome. Religion can not achieve anything as long as it is not implemented in peoples' attitudes and behaviour and at least in social, hierarchical and political structures.
Only then is an indirect influence on income possible. Over decades and centuries, religious codes have become a part of the prevalent culture. Although individuals acting according to particular cultural norms and values may not connect these features to religion any more, tracing the cultural properties back to their origin shows that religion is the starting point.
The relation between religion and formal institutions can best be seen regarding theocratic states where religion claims terrestrial and religious power. However, even in countries where state and religious power are separated, a basic attitude arising out of the religious background is prevalent. Hence, originally religious beliefs constitute world views and ideologies, that is, political ideologies, the general understanding of the state and the societal system per se. Even if this is not the case and no general political ideology is prevalent in the society, certain cultural traits originating in religion may support a particular political system through acquiescence and obedience. Hence, to note these differences, the Muslim affiliation of the population is used to illustrate formal institutions. That is, Protestant affiliation is assumed to be supportive of economic growth, while Muslim affiliation is said to be growth-inhibiting (Landes, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Guiso et al., 2003 
Data and regression approach
However, institutions are not the only deep determinant of growth. Of course, geography is a further determinant that affects factor accumulation and productivity. It makes a difference whether a country has access to the seaside and is located in a temperate climate zone, or whether it is embedded in inaccessible terrain and has to cope with climatic extremes like droughts and heat or severe rainfall and cold. Moreover, the geographical position determines a country's resource endowment and is responsible for the disease environment. A further deep determinant is integration or, alternatively, trade or openness. As some countries are more accessible and easier to reach than others, integration is, of course, influenced by geography. Moreover, several connections between integration, institutions and the proximate determinants exist, as all the factors influence each other (Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004) .
Hence, running a regression analysis with only institutions as independent variables will result in biased coefficients, as other deep determinants are omitted. Therefore, geography and openness will also be incorporated into the following empirical work.
In my analysis, I follow Tabellini The last growth-supporting feature is respect. In the WVS, the corresponding question is:
'Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. The fourth element of Tabellini's cultural indicator is obedience. This factor is not supportive of growth as it increases. The appropriate question in the WVS is again the one asking for important qualities in children. Hence, obedience is measured by the percentage of respondents answering that obedience is an important quality for children to learn. Obedience without further reflection is a typical feature of hierarchical societies. Individualism is suppressed and obedience is more important than one's own opinion and personal responsibility. The suppression of individualism makes cooperation difficult and has negative effects on economic development (Tabellini, 2005) . Therefore, respect and obedience are used as proxies for the societal structure, resulting in generalized vs. limited morality.
Accordingly, a country with a high level of respect and a low level of obedience is expected to realize generalized morality and vice versa. To allow for ecological conditions and geography, I use a measure of malaria risk. The variable is called malfal94 and was first introduced by Gallup et al. (1998) . It emerged from a variable called MAL94P, which depicts '… the proportion of each country's population that live with risk of malaria transmission …' (Sachs, 2003, p. 5) . Malfal94 '… multiplies the MALP94 index by an estimate of the proportion of national malaria cases that involve the fatal species, Plasmodium falciparum, as opposed to three largely non-fatal species of the malaria pathogen (P. vivax, P. malariae, and P. ovale)' (Sachs, 2003, p. 5 Equation (2) corresponds to (1) with only the accordant proxies being inserted:
1 2 3 4 log(rgdpl) inf orm4 xconst malfal94 openk = α + β + β + β + β .
First of all, the equation is estimated via OLS. However, as the causality between institutions
and per capita income is mutual, endogeneity is definitely an issue in the regression, and therefore OLS may not be an accurate estimation method.
However, the 2SLS method is used to solve the problem of unclear causality between institutions and per capita income. Consequently, the other regressors are assumed to be exogenous.
At any rate, after instrumenting for formal and informal institutions, endogeneity could still be an issue with respect to geography and integration. Definitely, a higher per capita income lowers malaria risk. Better health care is affordable at the state, as well as at the individual, level and vaccines are available for major parts of the population. Being aware of this issue, Sachs (2003) introduced an instrumental variable called Malaria Ecology (ME), which 'is built upon climatological and vector conditions on a country-by-country basis, and is therefore exogenous to public health interventions and economic conditions, [therefore] ME provides an ideal instrumental variable for malaria risk' (Sachs, 2003, p. 7) . Hence, ME is used as the instrument for malaria risk.
Concerning openness, it could be argued that richer countries are prone to open their economies as they are not protecting infant or other indigenous industries from competition on the world market. Hence, openness may lead to higher incomes, but higher incomes may also cause more openness. As in the former malaria case, it reverts to a well-established instrumental variable concerning openness, and therefore the natural logarithm of the Frankel-Romer actual trade share, logfrankrom, is used (Frankel and Romer, 1999) .
Regression results
Since the empirical analysis consists of different data sets, the number of included countries varies between 72 and 55.
The first column of Table 1 demonstrates the OLS regression results. A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 1.1 percentage point increase in per capita income. The result is significant at the 1 per cent level. The coefficient on xconst is also significant at the 1 per cent level. Accordingly, a 1-score increase leads to a rise in per capita income of 13 per cent. Of course, the coefficient on malfal94 has a negative sign as an increase in malaria risk leads to a decline in income. Openk is significant at the 5 per cent level and its coefficient is quite small, but at any rate a positive effect of openness on income becomes apparent.
As the size of the coefficients can be misleading concerning the variables' impact on income compared with each other, the first column of Table 2 presents the beta coefficients of the OLS regression. When measured in standard deviations, inform4 has the largest effect on per capita income compared with all the included variables. Therefore, informal institutions seem to play a decisive role in explaining per capita income patterns.
Columns two and three of Table 1 show the first-and second-stage regressions of a 2SLS estimation using protestant as an instrument for informal institutions. The remaining independent variables in this regression are assumed to be exogenous. The coefficient on protestant in the first-stage regression, which is significant at the 1 per cent level, demonstrates the variables' correlation with inform4, which is a precondition for its use as an instrumental variable. The second-stage regression confirms the OLS results. The coefficient on inform4 is significant at the 1 per cent level. A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 1.2 percentage point rise in per capita income. A 1-score increase of xconst on its scale from 1 to 7 leads to a 12 per cent higher per capita income.
Again, the beta coefficients in column three of Table 2 shed some light on the relation of the independent variables concerning their impact on per capita income. A 1 standard deviation increase in inform4 leads to an increase of 0.49 standard deviations in per capita income. The other variables' beta coefficients are smaller than that. Regressions (6)- (8) show the 2SLS results when we use instrumental variables for all the independent variables. Thus, regression (6) uses protestant as an instrument for inform4, muslim as an instrument for xconst, me as an instrument for malfal94 and logfrankrom as an instrument for openk. Regression (7) is consistent with regression (6), but it uses catholic instead of muslim as an instrument for xconst. Regression (8) also corresponds to regressions (6) and (7), but uses catholic and muslim as instruments for xconst. Hence, regressions (6)- (8) differ concerning the instrumental variables that are used to instrument for xconst. Apart from that, they are equal. The first-stage regressions for malfal94 and openk are listed in the continuation 1 of table 3. At any rate, the instrumental variables me and logfrankrom are highly significant in each case.
In regression (6), muslim is used as instrumental variable for xconst. Now, protestant is only significant on inform4, while muslim is significant and negatively correlated with xconst. All the regressors of the second-stage regression are significant at least at the 10 per cent level. A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.89 percentage point increase in per capita income. If xconst rises at 1 score, per capita income increases at 18.4 per cent. Regarding the beta coefficients in Table 4 , a 1 standard-deviation increase in inform4 leads to a rise in per capita income of 0.37 standard deviations, which is nearly the same amount as the beta coefficient on xconst.
In regression (7), again, catholic is used instead of muslim as an instrumental variable for xconst, while all the independent variables are assumed to be endogenous. However, inform4 is significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficient on xconst again increases compared with regressions (1) and (3), in which muslim is used as instrument, though the increase is not excessive. The most notable alteration occurs in the beta-coefficients table, where the coefficient on xconst increases to 0.47 standard deviations. Hence, using catholic as an instrument for formal institutions, xconst gains more importance regarding its effect on per capita income and compared with the other regressors, while inform4 becomes less significant.
Regression (8) is overidentified -that is, protestant, muslim and catholic are used as instrumental variables. However, when muslim is incorporated, catholic is not significant in the first-stage regression on xconst. Instead, muslim is negatively correlated with xconst and significant at the 1 per cent level. Protestant is also significant at the 1 per cent level in the first-stage regression on inform4. All the regressors are significant in the second-stage regression. A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase in per capita income. If xconst increases at 1 score, income rises at 19.6 per cent. Regarding the beta coefficients, the coefficient on xconst decreases to 0.37 standard deviations, but is still slightly higher than the coefficient on inform4. However, using protestant, muslim and catholic as instrumental variables, the disturbing effect of catholic decreases. The coefficients on inform4 and xconst are comparable with the ones using only protestant and muslim, and thus the overidentified regression can be used as a test of robustness. If catholic has a significant effect that disturbs the relationship, the result would not be robust in comparison with the ones using protestant and muslim. Thus, the correlation between protestant, muslim, xconst and inform4 is stable. At any rate, catholic does not seem to fit into the intuitive argument. While Protestantism and Islam seem to have an impact on institutions, this must not hold for all religions.
To assure the results, some tests were conducted in order to shed light on a few issues concerning instrumental variable estimation (continuation 2 of table 3). However, the small sample size demonstrates a problem regarding 2SLS estimation as well as testing. However, as we are working with country data and different data sets, there is nothing we can do about that issue. Therefore, the tests can best be seen as additional coverage, but they are not fully reliable and have to be considered with caution. Most assumptions and conclusions must be considered by relying on intuition.
A perpetual issue in empirical work is that of heteroskedasticity. Although heteroskedasticity does not affect the consistency of the instrumental variable coefficient estimate, it does affect the estimates of the standard errors. Therefore, the Pagan-Hall test was applied to regressions 4, 5 and 6 to detect possible heteroskedasticity in the 2SLS estimations. The results suggest that heteroskedasticity is not existent in the accordant regressions. However, caution is advisable concerning this outcome as the Pagan-Hall test statistic might not be useful working with small sample sizes (Baum et al., 2003) . Therefore, additionally, the WhiteKoenker test statistic was used, even though this test is usually not applied in instrumental variable estimation. However, again, the result suggests that no heteroskedasticity is prevalent.
Concerning the validity of the instruments, the Sargan test statistic was implemented, again only for the case of overidentification, as the test is not valid otherwise. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected, and thus the instrumental variables are not correlated with the disturbance. Again, we cannot fully rely on the test statistic since the Sargan test may not be valid when all the instruments share the same rationale (Murray, 2006) . As three religious affiliation variables are used as instrumental variables, this is definitely the case, and thus the test only affirms our regression results but cannot be seen as evidence.
Finally, the Shea statistic to test for the issue of instrumental variable irrelevance was applied.
Again, we achieved a positive result since at least the instruments for institutions are clearly relevant. To solve the problem of instrumental variable irrelevance, it is also useful to have a look at the first-stage regression results. The relevance is confirmed, since all the instruments are highly significant with respect to the accordant endogenous regressors. (6)- (8) were run including further independent variables, respectively. However, Panel A incorporates dummy variables for English and French legal origin as additional regressors.
The original regression results are robust. Again, inform4 becomes insignificant when catholic is used as the sole instrumental variable for formal institutions. Moreover, the coefficient on malfal94 further decreases. Interestingly, the coefficient on English legal origin is significant at the 5 per cent level in all the regressions.
Panel B includes a measure of population density, pop100km. Again, the original regression results are robust with respect to the inclusion of the additional regressors, while pop100km itself is insignificant.
In panels C, D and E, the variables coastline, temperature and landlocked from the Parker 
Conclusion
The article tries to incorporate cultural traits into growth analysis and examines whether the emergence of institutions can be traced back to religious origins. The assumption is that not only formal but also informal institutions have an impact on economic growth. Theoretical and empirical analysis must consider the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. The relevance of this result stems from the particular properties of informal institutions. In general, institutions are characterized by their stickiness, and thus alterations take place slowly. Institutions that are responsible in particular for self-identification, that is informal institutions, are even more resistant to change (Roland, 2005; Boettke et al., 2008) . At the same time, these institutions are jointly responsible for economic development and are ambiguously correlated with formal institutions and income. Hence, an alteration of formal institutions that obviously hinder growth encounters several problems. First, formal and informal institutions are correlated, and many formal institutions even originate in informal institutions. Therefore, when changing formal institutions, the ambiguous transmission channels and the prevalent informal institutions must be considered. Otherwise, the change can lead to unexpected results. At the least, the modification could worsen the situation or simply have no effect, as the prevalent culture might not match the formal transformations.
Second, political or economic patterns, which in general are considered to be supportive of economic growth, do not do the job in certain countries with different societal and cultural origins, and thus some institutions cannot be exogenously modified -that is, the transformation of institutions is constrained. Third, no true or right institutional structure exists, as the quality of institutions depends on their societal environment. Hence, institutions that might be judged as growth-inhibiting in one country can be quite effective somewhere else. This holds for formal as well as informal institutions.
Of course, this means that a general pattern of growth that can be applied to every country does not exist. Although this conclusion might be depressing because it limits the scope for development economics, it has important political implications in that the implementation of standard Western institutions might not be helpful in certain cases. Thus, in the majority of cases, externally imposed institutions that are not rooted in the historical and cultural environment will not be accepted. 
